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1 INTRODUCTION 
Evaluating safety instrumented systems [SIS] reliabil-
ity has been necessary due to societal issues and leg-
islation. The main European standard for SIS as-
sessment is the IEC 61508 (IEC 2005) which 
requires determining a probability of failure on de-
mand [PFD] for each part of the system: detectors, 
logic units, and actuators. The relevance of existing 
models (reliability equations, reliability block dia-
grams, fault tree analysis, Markov processes etc.) 
strongly depends on the quality of input data as fail-
ure rates, maintenance characteristics, and common 
cause parameters. 
By lack of reliability feedback data, generic failure 
rates from data handbooks are commonly used. They 
usually come from offshore, military, or nuclear 
power plant activities. However, the influencing fac-
tors of many systems are sometimes obviously het-
erogeneous and it is certainly inaccurate to assign the 
same failure rate to all of these systems. In this 
framework, predictive models have been developed, 
for electronic (DoD of USA 1991) or mechanical 
(NSWC 1998) components. Unfortunately they are 
too specific to be suitable for every SIS characteristic 
and environmental condition. Statistical models also 
exist, but such models require a lot of feedback 
knowledge. For example, some other approaches fo-
cus on organizational factors, using mainly feedback 
data or expert judgment. 
A definition and a classification of influencing fac-
tors are proposed in the Section 2. Section 3 includes 
review of existing reliability models which take into 
account internal or external factors. Section 4 is the 
main part and introduces a new method for failure 
rate evaluation with influencing factors. The method-
ology is composed by seven steps and has been espe-
cially developed for SIS. An example regarding 
safety pressure relief valves is briefly presented and 
discussed in Section 5, followed by the conclusion. 
2 INFLUENCING FACTORS 
2.1 Introduction to the influencing factors 
According to the IEC 60050 standard (IEC 1990), 
the reliability is the ability of an item to perform a re-
quired function under given conditions for a given 
time interval. The quantitative measurement of the 
reliability is usually made by a failure rate evaluation. 
This parameter is intrinsic to the item, its environ-
ment and conditions of use. Nevertheless, it is possi-
ble to observe failure rate realizations by a number of 
failures per time unit. The influencing factors denote 
the parameters which determine the value of the fail-
ure rate. These factors represent the “given condi-
tions” mentioned in the reliability definition. 
The following definition will be used in the pre-
sent paper: the influencing factors [relating to the re-
liability] are the internal and external parts of an item 
which act on its reliability, for example by causing 
failure rate changes. The effects may be positive, by 
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causing a reduction of failure number per time unit, 
or negative, by causing a higher number of failures. 
For example, mechanical equipment failures may 
occur due to some physical phenomena as fatigue, 
fissures or erosion which all depend on the equip-
ment design, material properties, solicitations, or en-
vironmental interactions. In order to obtain influenc-
ing factor measurements, it is necessary to establish 
indicators e.g. type of material, solicitation frequency 
and load, humidity rate. A reliability modelling with 
influencing factors then consists in defining a failure 
rate evaluation according to these indicator values. 
Figure 1 sums up the effect of influencing factors on 
reliability, through the failures and their causes, and 
how a corresponding reliability model can be defined. 
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Figure 1. The influencing factors and the reliability 
2.2 An influencing factors classification 
The proposed influencing factors classification is 
made according to the system life cycle. This work 
takes advantage of the references which are pre-
sented in the next section. 
 the design factors which are intrinsic-natured to 
the system: type, working principle, sizes, materi-
als, component quality etc. 
 the factors related to the manufacturer and the 
manufacture process (including the potential effect 
on surface finish) 
 the factors due to installation and activation (in-
cluding access facilities) 
 the factors which act when the system is used: so-
licitation frequency and load, electrical load (volt-
age, intensity), environment (mechanical con-
straints, temperature, humidity, pollution), 
performance or reliability requirements etc. 
 the maintenance factors: the quantity and the qual-
ity of preventive and corrective actions 
Human and organizational factors can be added. A 
classification is proposed by Aven et al. (2006) which 
details five groups: the characteristics of the person-
nel performing the tasks, the characteristics of the 
task being performed, the characteristics of the tech-
nical system, the administration control, and the or-
ganizational factors / operational philosophy. 
3 FAILURE RATE EVALUATION 
3.1 Reliability feedback data and data handbooks 
The most efficient means to obtain a suitable failure 
rate value is certainly the reliability feedback data. 
Some industrialists have collected data from their 
own applications, mainly from power plants or off-
shore platforms. In this way, the values fit equipment 
characteristics, environment and conditions of use. 
Unfortunately, a significant equipment field, appro-
priate procedures and a long practice are required. 
By lack of such feedback knowledge, reliability 
data handbooks are commonly used. They give some 
generic data, usually from offshore (OREDA and 
PDS Handbook by SINTEF 2002 & 2006), military 
(NPRD-95 and EPRD-97 by RiAC 1995 & 1997) or 
nuclear power plant (EIReDA by EC 1998) activi-
ties. The users of these books presume the data can 
be transposed to their equipment and for their appli-
cations even though technical, operational and envi-
ronmental conditions are seldom detailed. However, 
non negligible failure rate differences from a data 
handbook to another let suppose that the recorded 
systems are very heterogeneous. Some explanations 
can be given: 
 all type of equipment have their own characteris-
tics (intrinsic factors) i.e. for a system type, sev-
eral kind of equipment with different reliability pa-
rameters exist 
 operational, environmental and maintenance con-
ditions are sometimes very heterogeneous from 
one type of equipment to another (extrinsic fac-
tors), especially between activities 
 to obtain significant results and collect them in a 
usable data handbook, it is usually necessary to 
group together systems with different intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors 
Using these data handbooks without consideration 
may therefore yield high reliability evaluation uncer-
tainties. These weaknesses may be offset, for exam-
ple by Bayesian approaches and expert judgment 
(Lanternier et al. 2005). 
3.2 Failure rate evaluation with influencing factors 
3.2.1 Frameworks for human and organizational 
factors 
A lot of methods have been proposed to take into 
account the human and organizational factors in the 
reliability evaluations or quantitative risk analyses: 
Manager (1990), MACHINE (1992), WPAM 
(Davoudian et al. 1994), ISM (1994), ω-factor model 
(1996), SAM (1996), RIA (Rosness 1998), I-Risk 
(1999), ORIM (Øien 2001b), ARAMIS (2004), 
BORA-Release (Aven et al. 2006). Five representa-
tive steps are given by Rosness (1998): 
1 preparation of the analysis in order to define the 
field and the scope of the study 
2 documents and data collection 
3 qualitative analysis which aims at defining a gen-
eral model, selecting the influencing factors, and 
set the current factor states 
4 quantitative analysis to evaluate the effect of each 
factor and to calculate the results according to the 
model 
5 verification and documentation which consist in 
validating and formalizing the results 
Some tools have been developed for the qualitative 
step, especially for the model definition and factor se-
lection. For example, a conceptual tree is proposed in 
RIA, an organizational model in ORIM, and a risk in-
fluence diagram in BORA-Release. Then, in order to 
set the current states of factors, expert judgment is 
often used. Aven et al. propose a scale from A (best 
standard in industry) to F (worst practice). WPAM 
suggests the use of questionnaires and audits, while 
in ORIM, indicators from 1 to 5 are developed. 
Starting from this point, quantitative analysis aims 
at formulating a final result (level of risk, probability 
of failure, failure rate) according to the potential 
changes of the influencing factors. In this scope, rat-
ing processes consist of assigning a weight to each 
factor in order to contrast their effects. Expert judg-
ment is always used, except for ORIM where a Cox 
model is proposed. According to the model, the fac-
tors influence is added up or a Bayesian network is 
used to modify baseline values. 
3.2.2 Electronic component failure rate evaluation 
with influencing factors 
In a safety instrumented system [SIS], detectors and 
logic units can usually be seen as electronic equip-
ment. The inclusion of influencing factors into the 
failure rate evaluation generally consists of predictive 
models. The first related standard is the MIL-HDBK-
217. It appeared in 1960 for military applications. 
The 1991 revision (DoD of USA 1991) is now well 
known and used by industrialists. 
The failure rates are given by analytical functions 
which depend directly on some parameters as tem-
perature, voltage or electrical intensity. The baseline 
values correspond to reference conditions. Coeffi-
cients are then multiplied according to the influencing 
factors (part stress analysis). The failure rate of a sys-
tem is obtained by adding the failure rate of all its 
components (part count analysis). This approach is 
especially useful during the design phase when no 
test has been done yet. Nevertheless, all the values of 
the influencing factors have to be well known. 
A lot of similar standards have then been devel-
oped, especially for military applications: 217Plus 
methodology by the DoD of USA, the French FIDES 
(UTE 2004) and the Chinese GJB/z 299B; and for 
telecoms: Telcordia standard (ex-Bellcore), RDF 
2000 by Union Technique de l’Électricité [UTE], 
HDR4 and HDR5 by British Telecommunication 
[BT]. Finally, the IEC 61709 standard (IEC 1996) 
deals with reference conditions for stress models. 
3.2.3 Mechanical component failure rate evalua-
tion with influencing factors 
The SIS actuators are mainly mechanical equipment 
e.g. valves, pumps, breaks. They usually cause half 
the faults and failures of SIS. Moreover, due to the 
high diversity and conditions of use, the reliability is 
particularly subject to influencing factors. 
Only one predictive model can be found for me-
chanical components, the NSWC-98/LE1 standard 
(NSWC 1998). The influencing factors are numer-
ous: temperature, pressure, fluid and material proper-
ties, load, performance requirements and so forth. 
Unfortunately, the eighteen components which are 
developed are not enough for safety instrumented 
system analyses. Moreover, some required influenc-
ing factor values are very difficult to know (allowable 
leakage rate, fluid viscosity) and the reference values 
do not fit industrial processes. For example, the base-
line valve pressure activation is 200 bars whereas in 
industry this value seldom exceeds 60 bars. 
Without a priori knowledge about physical rela-
tions between failure rates and influencing factors, 
statistical approaches are briefly proposed in CCPS 
1999 and Debray et al. 2004. Feedback data is used 
in order to observe failure rate trends which depend 
on influencing factors. When a lot of data is collected 
and the influencing factors are detailed, Lanternier et 
al. 2006 and Brissaud et al. 2007 propose the use of 
a Cox model. By using a Weibull law, this approach 
has the particularity to give a failure rate which de-
pends both on influencing factors and time. Finally, 
Lanternier 2007 presents also the use of neuronal 
networks. 
4 A NEW MODEL FOR FAILURE RATE 
EVALUATION WITH INFLUENCING 
FACTORS 
4.1 A new model especially developed for SIS 
A new methodology for failure rate evaluation will 
be proposed in the present paper. To be usable in 
most SIS reliability evaluations, the following par-
ticularities have been set: 
 the methodology should be global enough to be 
usable for a large number of safety systems (espe-
cially actuators) and influencing factors 
 a qualitative analysis has to compensate for a po-
tential lack of data from feedback knowledge by 
the use of organized expert judgment 
 the quantitative part has to allow improvements 
when some feedback data is newly available 
 even if it is certainly not conceivable to obtain an 
exact reliability evaluation without much feedback 
data, the methodology should give argued results 
which logically depend on influencing factors 
 the prospect is for risk analyses which allow more 
efficient risk managements by acting both on 
equipment and influencing factors 
4.2 General presentation of the model 
The general form will be the same as the predictive 
models. The equipment is divided into several main 
component groups as a serial system i.e. the failure 
rate is obtained by the sum of the main component 
groups failure rates. To have an a priori idea of the 
whole equipment failure rate is usually more realistic 
than accurate values for all the components. Each 
component (i.e. main component group) baseline 
failure rate will therefore be expressed as a percent-
age of the whole system baseline failure rate. 
The effects of the influencing factors will then be 
included by influencing coefficients. Each coefficient 
corresponds to one factor and vice-versa. If a com-
ponent is liable to an influencing factor, the baseline 
failure rate is multiplied by the corresponding influ-
encing coefficient. The coefficient values are defined 
according to the states of the influencing factors: 
 if the influencing factor is supposed to be in a me-
dium state according to the reliability, the corre-
sponding influencing coefficient is equal to one 
 if the influencing factor is supposed to be in a 
more suitable state (resp. a less suitable state), the 
corresponding influencing coefficient is smaller 
than one (resp. greater than one) 
These properties can be summed up by the formulas: 
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where λs and λi are respectively the system and the 
components (i.e. main component groups) failure 
rates, according to the current states of the influenc-
ing factors; λs,mean and λi,mean the baseline system and 
components failure rates; ci the contribution (in per-
centage) of component i in the whole baseline system 
failure rate; N the number of components which 
compose the system; Cj* the influencing coefficient 
which corresponds to the influencing factor j; Ji the 
set of influencing factors indices which have an effect 
on component i. 
In order to have coherent results with a presup-
posed failure rate scale, a prior interval [λs,min; λs,max] 
is set. The main idea of the methodology is to use 
some criteria to fix the failure rate inside this interval, 
according to the influencing factor states. The 
method is based on these following propositions 
which are summed up in Figure 2: 
 the system baseline failure rate λs,mean is reached 
when all the influencing factors are, on average, in 
a medium state 
 the lower value λs,min (resp. the upper value λs,max) 
of the prior interval is reached when all the influ-
encing factors are, on average, in a defined pro-
portion Ψ of the most suitable states (resp. the 
least suitable states) 
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Figure 2. Fundamental assumptions of the proposed model 
4.3 A seven-step methodology 
The proposed methodology is composed by seven 
steps. Qualitative analysis (step 1 to 3) and quantita-
tive analysis (step 1 and 4 to 7) are combined in a 
framework which can be seen as an adaptation of the 
steps for human and organizational factors. 
4.3.1 Step 1: functional analysis and input data 
First of all, it is advisable to delimit the scope of the 
study: which equipment (valve, pump, detector etc.) 
to be applied and for which safety function and appli-
cation. The failure rate has to be defined precisely. 
For example, only the dangerous and undetected fail-
ures can be relevant for the study, and the unit can be 
the number of failures per hours or per solicitations. 
Using available feedback data, reliability data 
handbooks and, if required, expert judgment, a sys-
tem baseline failure rate (λs,mean) has to be set. It must 
fit as much as possible the medium conditions, ac-
cording to the reliability, wherein the system can be. 
This baseline value is surrounded by an interval 
([λs,min; λs,max]). It corresponds to the extreme failure 
rates which are possible to observe for this type of 
system, according to the worst and the most suitable 
influencing factor states. 
A failure mode, effect, and criticality analysis 
[FMECA] is recommended to identify the compo-
nents (i.e. main component groups) of the system 
which are liable to different influencing factors. Us-
ing the FMECA and, if available, some reliability 
data, the contribution of each component in the base-
line system failure rate (ci with i=1,…,N) has to be 
evaluated. 
4.3.2 Step 2: model definition and influencing fac-
tors selection 
A reliability influencing diagram is proposed for 
model definition and the selection of relevant influ-
encing factors. Four levels are built from right to left. 
These levels are composed by elements (the circles), 
and influencing relations (the arrows): 
 the first level has only one element which is the 
system identification 
 the second level is composed by the main compo-
nent groups of the system which have been identi-
fied in step 1. Each element of this level is linked 
to the system element of the previous level 
 the elements of the third level are the system life 
cycle phases which also correspond to the influ-
encing factors categories (see table 1). When a 
phase is supposed to have a non negligible effect 
on a component reliability, an arrow is drawn be-
tween the two corresponding elements 
 the last level represents the selected influencing 
factors for each life cycle phase which is relevant 
for reliability 
An example of influencing diagram is given in Figure 
4 for a safety pressure relief valve. 
 
Table 1.  Sample of checklist for influencing factors selection ______________________________________________ 
Category    Influencing factors  ______________________________________________ 
Design     System type 
       Working principle 
Sizes (height, volume, weight) 
Materials 
Component quality (quality requirements 
and controls) 
       Special characteristics (supply) 
Manufacture   Manufacturer 
Manufacture process (procedures, controls) 
Installation   Location (access facilities) 
       Assembly/Activation (procedures, controls) 
Use  EUC*    EUC* type 
         Special characteristics 
   Solicitation  Type of load (cycling, random) 
         Frequency of use 
Loading charge/Activation threshold 
Electrical load (voltage, intensity) 
Environment Mechanical constraints (vibration, 
friction, shocks) 
Temperature 
         Corrosion/Humidity 
         Pollution (dust, impurities) 
Other stresses (electromagnetism, 
climate) 
   Requirements Performance requirements 
         Failure modes (recorded failures) 
Maintenance   Frequency of preventive maintenance 
       Quality of preventive maintenance 
       Quality of corrective maintenance _____________________________________________ 
* Equipment Under Control 
 
Table 1 gives a sample of checklist for influencing 
factors selection. The choice of the influencing fac-
tors has to follow some criteria: 
 it is possible to measure or evaluate the states 
 the state measurements or evaluation has to allow 
making differences between systems 
 the selected factors are exhaustive enough to ex-
plain the observable reliability differences 
An influencing matrix FN,M is defined on N*M as fol-
lows: FN,M(i,j)=1 if the component i is liable to the 
influence of factor j, FN,M(i,j)=0 otherwise. 
4.3.3 Step 3: indicators choice and graduation 
An indicator is the means to observe the state of an 
influencing factor. Øien 2001a proposes some criteria 
for indicator choice in terms of the amount of data, 
available sources, relationships with observed fac-
tors, validity and repeatability. 
For the model which is developed, the indicators 
have to be set on a numerical scale. Moreover, the 
effects of factors (positive or negative) will be as-
sumed to be continuous and monotonous according 
to the indicator values. For qualitative indicators 
(e.g. manufacturer name, type of material), a scale 
from 0 for “very not suitable for reliability” to 5 for 
“very suitable for reliability” is proposed. For quanti-
tative indicators (e.g. pressure, voltage, tempera-
ture), the values can be directly used if account for 
the previous conditions. Otherwise, a multiple level 
scale has to be defined as for qualitative indicators. 
Using technical reports, operational data, feed-
back knowledge, measures, investigation with key 
staff and so on, three particular levels have to be set 
for each indicator: one which represents the medium 
influencing factor state, two which represent the ex-
treme observable values (the least and the most suit-
able values for reliability). 
The scale for the indicator Ij of the influencing 
factor j is denoted [Ij,lower; Ij,upper] and the three par-
ticular levels are Ij,mean for the medium value, Ij,worst 
and Ij,best for respectively the least and the most suit-
able values which are observable. 
4.3.4 Step 4: influencing factors rating 
A weight is given to each selected influencing factor. 
It represents the relative potential effect on the liable 
component failure rates, according to a change from 
the least to the most suitable value of the corre-
sponding indicator. 
A rating from 1 to 5 or from 1 to 10 is usually 
suitable for the model. Feedback knowledge, gradu-
ating processes, comparisons by pair, tests or expert 
judgment can be used to set weights. The weight of 
the influencing factor j is denoted Wj and it is normal-
ized using Equation (4) given in Appendix A. 
4.3.5 Step 5: indicator functions 
In order to deal with uncertainties, especially when 
expert judgment is required, indicator functions aims 
at representing the current indicator values not as 
fixed points, but as probability density functions. In 
fact, the indicators values are seldom known pre-
cisely and are sometimes subject to changes during 
the system life cycle (temperature, humidity, load). 
Three density function types are proposed: 
 uniform distribution when expert judgment is the 
main used means to evaluate the indicator value 
e.g. it is supposed that the influencing conditions 
are quite benefit or not for the reliability 
 triangular distribution if the indicator value is de-
terministic and has to be translated on a defined 
scale e.g. the indicator value is given on a scale 
from 0 to 5 according to the “degree of suitabil-
ity” for the reliability 
 Gaussian distribution when the quantitative indica-
tor value is directly used e.g. pressure, tempera-
ture, volume etc. 
Examples of these three distributions for safety pres-
sure relief valves are given in Figure 5 to 7. In this 
example, the sizes influencing factor is set on a de-
terministic scale with qualitative values (big, medium, 
small). The allowable leakage rate which represents 
the performance requirements is defined as restric-
tive or indulgent according to expert judgment. Fi-
nally, the pressure of activation (in bars) is a quanti-
tative indicator for loading charge influencing factor. 
The indicator function of the influencing factor j is 
denoted gj(Ij) and is defined on [Ij,lower; Ij,upper]. 
4.3.6 Step 6: influencing functions 
The influencing functions aims at formulating the in-
fluencing coefficients according to the indicators val-
ues. An example of this type of function is given in 
Figure 3. The functions are built by setting three par-
ticular values: one which corresponds to a medium 
indicator value (denoted Cj(Ij,mean)), two which corre-
spond to the least and the most suitable indicator 
values (resp. Cj(Ij,worst) and Cj(Ij,best)). They can be ob-
tained by the formulas given in Appendix A. They 
take into account the previous steps, including the in-
fluencing factor weights. Linear relations are then as-
sumed between these particular values, as presented 
in Figure 3. These functions are extrapolated all over 
the indicator scales [Ij,lower; Ij,upper]. 
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Figure 3. Example of influencing function Cj(Ij) 
 
4.3.7 Step 7: final results 
Given the indicator functions (gj(Ij)) which express 
the states of the influencing factors; and the influenc-
ing functions (Cj(Ij)) which formulate the influencing 
coefficients; both according to the indicators, the in-
fluencing coefficients (Cj*) are calculated by: 
    
upperj
lowerj
I
I jjjjjj
dIIgICC ,
,
*  for Mj ,...,1  (3) 
The final system failure rate is then obtained by using 
Formulas (1) and (2) with the input data of the first 
step. Note that the use of density functions for indi-
cators in Equation (3) mitigates the potential effects 
of the assumptions from step 6 (about the definition 
of influencing functions) on results. 
5 APPLICATION TO SAFETY PRESSURE 
RELIEF VALVES 
5.1 Presentation of the application 
In order to illustrate the use of the proposed meth-
odology, an application to safety pressure relief 
valves is developed. The results will be compared to 
the real failure rates in order to assess the model ac-
curacy. Nevertheless, it is not realistic to claim to 
know real failure rates. It is only possible to observe 
the mean time a system is functioning and to make 
failure rate estimations from that. This is why the fol-
lowing approach will be used: 
1 set a fictitious panel of systems with defined influ-
encing factor conditions 
2 allocate to each system a failure rate which is set 
as the true value i.e. the “real failure rate”. A “hid-
den model” is used in order to have coherent fail-
ure rates according to the influencing factors 
3 by using the real failure rates, simulate times to 
failure for each system by Monte Carlo method 
4 use the times to failure simulations as input data 
for the proposed methodology 
5 compare the results with the real failure rates 
Note that the real failure rates are not used in the 
model which is tested, only the times to failure simu-
lations are required and the influencing factors states. 
5.2 Application results 
Fourteen safety pressure relief valves are in the panel. 
Valve number #1 is assumed to be in the most suit-
able conditions for the reliability whereas numbers 
#6-9 correspond to medium conditions, and number 
#14 to the worst. Each valve is composed by a pop-
pet assembly, a seal, and a spring (i.e. the main com-
ponent groups). The respective baseline component 
contributions are 70%, 5% and 25%. The three se-
lected influencing factors are the sizes with a weight 
of 3, the loading charge with a weight of 2, and the 
performance requirements with a weight of 1. 
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Figure 4. Reliability influencing diagram for safety pressure 
relief valves example 
 
Figure 4 shows the reliability influencing diagram and 
Figures 5 to 7 the chosen indicators and indicator 
functions. Remark that the indicators values increase 
according to the “degree of suitability” (represented 
by the lightness of the curves) in the first two scales, 
and decrease in the third one. 
Predictive models from NSWC-98/LE1 (NSWC 
1998) have been used with some adaptations to set 
the real failure rates which are reported in Figure 8. 
According to a stated number of simulated times to 
failure per valve, two failure rate evaluations are 
tested: the inverse of the mean time to failure (maxi-
mum likelihood estimation [MLE]) and the failure 
rate evaluation with influencing factors (the proposed 
model, denoted frewif). For the frewif methodology, 
the MLE estimations of the valves #6-9, #1, and #14 
have been used as input data in step 1 i.e. to assess 
baseline and extreme failure rate values (resp. λs,mean, 
λs,min, and λs,max). The results of the MLE and the 
frewif evaluation are given in Figure 8 and 9. 
 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Valve size indicator
Big valve Medium valve Small valve
 
Figure 5. Indicator functions for sizes influencing factor 
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Figure 6. Indicator functions for performance requirements in-
fluencing factor 
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Figure 7. Indicator functions for loading charge influencing 
factor (the higher is the nominal pressure of activation, the 
greater the uncertainty is assumed to be) 
In the described conditions, the proposed meth-
odology gives more accurate results than MLE, es-
pecially when feedback data is low (few observed 
times to failure). Moreover, taking into account the 
influencing factors yield more argued and coherent 
evaluations than using only feedback data. 
In this example, only the quantitative part of the 
models is evaluated. In fact, it seems difficult to 
measure the quality of the functional analysis, factors 
and indicators selections. Nevertheless, some further 
analyses have shown that quality of the results for the 
proposed methodology is robust according to the in-
put data (input failure rates, component contribu-
tions, influencing factors weights). 
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Figure 8. Results of failure rate evaluations using 3 times to 
failure observed per valve (logarithm scale) 
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Figure 9. Average percentage of error with the real failure 
rates, according to the number of times to failure observed per 
valve (quantity of feedback data) 
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated the concept of influenc-
ing factors in reliability. A definition and a classifica-
tion have been proposed. Because systems have own 
characteristics, operational and environmental condi-
tions, the reliability parameters are often very hetero-
geneous. To ignore the influencing factors, for ex-
ample by using non-appropriate feedback data or 
data handbooks, therefore yields high reliability 
evaluation uncertainties. 
Specific models have been developed in order to 
include the human and organizational factors in quan-
titative risk analysis. Predictive models are also well 
established and allow taking into account influencing 
factors in failure rates of electronic components. Un-
fortunately, none of these models is general enough 
to be usable for most of the SIS assessments, espe-
cially for the actuators which are mechanical equip-
ments. Statistical models have been proposed in the 
literature but require a lot of reliability feedback 
knowledge and such data is seldom available. 
A new methodology for failure rate evaluation, 
especially developed for SIS, has then been proposed 
in the present paper. It is general enough to be usable 
for a large number of safety systems and influencing 
factors. Because a qualitative approach is combined 
with a quantitative part, it can compensate for a po-
tential lack of feedback knowledge, while allowing 
improvements when including data. Using density in-
dicator functions, the model also deals with uncer-
tainties in order to avoid dubious evaluations, par-
ticularly when expert judgment is required. 
The example regarding safety valves has shown 
that the proposed methodology provides, in some 
conditions, more accurate results than a classical ap-
proach as MLE, especially when the amount of feed-
back data is low. Moreover, by taking into account 
the influencing factors, the results are more argued 
and coherent according to the system conditions. 
There are therefore good prospects to use this 
methodology, notably in chemical industries, where a 
high variety of SIS can be found in very heterogene-
ous conditions, and the reliability feedback data is of-
ten low. A more efficient risk analysis and manage-
ment could then be performed by taking into account 
both safety systems and influencing factors. 
7 APPENDIX A: INFLUENCING FUNCTIONS 
Normalized weight wj for each influencing factor j: 
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The influencing reference coefficients C-ref and C+ref 
are obtained by solving these equations: 
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Particular values of the influencing functions: 
  1, meanjj IC  for Mj ,...,1  (7) 
   refjworstjj CwIC ,  for Mj ,...,1  (8) 
   ref
j
bestjj Cw
IC 1,  for Mj ,...,1  (9) 
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